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INTRODUCTION 
The phrase national philosophy sounds at best internally inconsistent, at 
worst chauvinistic. The themes of philosophy-- being, meaning, love, 
friendship-- appear to antedate and transcend necessary fictions like the 
Nation. In postrevolutionary Mexico, however, intellectuals of the new 
republic, having always found themselves on the cultural and intellectual 
periphery, depended on national ideas to forge the first Third World 
consciousness the world had as yet known. History students know about the 
general political ferment in the global South that began in Mexico and 
accelerated with such movements as Nasserism, India¹s independence, and 
the Cuban Revolution. Less known, however, is that, as early as the 1920s, 
pensadores were challenging not only the applicability of North American 
and European political and economic forms to Mexico, but also the 
universality of European and Anglo-American truth itself. Mexican and 
other Latin American intellectuals were recreating a peripheral intellectual 
resistance that had first taken root in 19th-century Germany. There, the 
romantics had refused to accept the perceived solipsism of the 
Enlightenment, i.e. English and French national principles masquerading as 
"recipes for mankind at large". Like these German romantics, Mexican 
philosophers waged a campaign to nationalize meaning, reason, and 
existence, at the same time as Mexican politicians nationalized industries. 
The ideas of José Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955), the famed Spanish essayist, 
lay at the center of this undertaking. Although Mexican writers only began 
discussing his work in the 1920s, by 1934, with the publication of Samuel 
Ramos¹ Ortega-inflected El perfil de hombre y cultura en México (Profile of 
Man and Culture in Mexico) Ortegan ideas had climbed atop the heap of 
possible paradigms answering the question: "what is true in the first 
liberated nation of the century?"-- in this respect, overtaking more expected 
contenders like Marx. The hegemony of Ortegan thought did not mean that 
Ortega himself was traveling around Mexico¹s universities and being feted 
by the smart set, as happened in Argentina in 1916 and 1928. Ortega¹s 
claims to the Latin world¹s allegiance, Mexican philosopher Leopoldo Zea 
wrote in 1956, came "in spite of himself", because Ortega only visited 
Argentina and "always resisted contact with the rest of America". His 
surrogates, however-- Spanish philosophers fleeing the political and 
intellectual hostility of Franco¹s regime-- arrived to share in the Mexican 
intellectual revolution. Barred from going home for decades, many made 
permanent homes in Mexico City. 
This report concerns the polemic between two of these men, José Gaos and 
Eduardo Nicol, over the 1950 publication of Nicol¹s sprawling discourse on 
being and time, entitled Historicismo y existencialismo (Historicity and 
Existentialism). Nicol¹s book and Gaos¹ dagger-wielding response to his 
colleague¹s effort both define and delimit the philosophical consensus in 
1950 Mexico. Intellectual historians have often observed the fickleness of 
revolutionary regimes like Cuba and Russia, where the court darlings of one 
year, e.g. José Lezama Lima and Boris Pasternak, can find themselves 
casualties of the Writers Union in the next. But while social scientists have 
amply investigated the mechanisms the "peaceful" post-Cárdenas regime 
used to box in possible political opposition, works that survey Mexico¹s 
intellectual history during this century, e.g. Romanell¹s Making of the 
Mexican Mind (1952), Weinstein¹s The Polarity of Mexican Thought (1976) 
do not address the comparable limit-setting that happened in the small 
world of Mexican philosophical study at mid-century. An inarguable leap 
forward occured in all Mexican intellectual enterprise after the violence 
died down in the 1920s, reactionaries were sent packing (exiled President 
Plutarco Elías Calles could not board his hasty flight to the United States 
without a dog-eared copy of Mein Kampf), Vasconcelos-conceived 
university reforms took root, and anti-imperialist intellectuals from Europe 
and the Americas began to detect and publicize that something dramatic 
was happening in Mexico City-- thereby, of course, helping to make it so. It 
is possible that scholars of Latin American intellectual history mistook new 
avenues for expression for open ones, analogous to the applause given 
Soviet intellectual production under Lenin, when Isaac Babel and other 
Jewish intellectuals were in ascendancy, as long as they remained uncritical. 
Newer work like that of José Luis Gómez-Martínez, Enrique Krauze, and 
Clara E. Lida attempts to rectify this simplistic picture of extreme 
intellectual freedom under President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-40) and the 
culturally experimental (and economically prosperous) period of the 1940s 
and 1950s. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHY IN TWENTIETH-
CENTURY MEXICO 
The philosophical consensus circa 1950 took root in events of the 1920s and 
1930s. Morse breaks the philosophical century in Latin America into two 
periods, both of which saw great intellectual ferment in Mexico. The 
Marburg school idealists, enemies of Porfirian positivism, came first, 
according to Morse. History primarily associates two writers, José 
Vasconcelos (1881-1959) and Antonio Caso (1883-1946), members of the 
Ateneo clique, with idealism in Mexico. As the most famous pensadores of 
the 1910s, they helped lead the new regime¹s Secretariat of Education and 
ruled an intellectual climate desperate to comprehend and explain the 
million deaths of the Revolution. Ateneo member Manuel Gómez Morín, 
reminiscing in 1927 about the national ferment of the violent years, lyrically 
expressed this yearning: 
[Through the struggle] was born the purpose of absolutely 
vindicating everything that could belong to us: petroleum and 
song, nationhood and ruins.
In this Utopian vein, Vasconcelos saw the Revolution from the beginning as 
a national rebirth into innocence. Just as their political counterparts, from 
Madero to Zapata, Villa, Carranza, and Obregón, blamed the tyrannies of 
Díaz and Huerta for making violence necessary, the ateneístas wreaked 
vengeance on positivism, the dominant thought of the Porfirian dictatorship. 
Using the scalpel of unbending reason, Caso claimed, the positivists tried to 
kill the essence of soulful Mexico, something Vasconcelos associated with 
the "cosmic" mixing of Spanish and Indian blood. 
The Ateneo dominated the most violent period of Mexican public life (1910-
25), but in the late Twenties, a group of younger intellectuals sought to 
rebel against the idealists of the 1910s. Again following Morse, this 
represented a regional trend away from idealism and toward the 
phenomenology of Husserl, of which Ortega was the main conduit for the 
Spanish-speaking world: "a return to metaphysics featuring the philosophy 
of culture, the theory of values, and existentialism," a new reason for a new 
republic. The values separating subject from object have no basis. Rather 
than consciousness grasping at reality, consciousness forms reality, with 
physical, biological and chemical truth becoming poor approximations of 
essential truth. 
Ramos (1897-1959) led the younger essayists and lecturers who embraced 
the new thinking in Mexico. He had little respect for Caso and Vasconcelos 
as intellects. Reminiscing in 1943, he wrote, 
An intellectual generation which began to act publicly 
between 1925 and 1930 felt uncomfortable with the 
philosophical romanticism of Caso and Vasconcelos. After a 
critical revision of their doctrines, they [i.e., we] found their 
anti-intellectualism baseless, but neither did they want to 
return to classical rationalism.  
   
 
Caso and Vasconcelos did not receive identical opprobrium, however. 
Ramos published a series of articles excoriating Caso¹s work, but 
Vasconcelos was spared, not on "anti-intellectual" or any philosophical 
bases, but because of politics: Ramos felt revolutionary sympathy with 
Vasconcelos¹ crusade to revolutionize Mexican public education. Ramos 
believed that it was not reason itself that threatened Mexico¹s intellectual 
nationhood, but rather the specific notion of reason-- scientific, unbending 
with time, and based in the individual consciousness-- central to all forms of 
liberalism, from John Stuart Mill to the hated Porfirian positivists. 
The solution to this dilemma lay in the writings of Ortega y Gasset. Again 
from the vantage of 1943, Ramos wrote, 
Meanwhile, philosophy appears not to fall within the ideal 
portrait of nationalism because it has always intended to 
situate itself with a universal human point of view, rebelling 
against time and space, concretely determined. Ortega y 
Gasset came to resolve this problem by showing the 
historicity of philosophy in El tema de nuestro tiempo. 
Joining these ideas with others which he had expounded in 
the Meditaciones del Quixote, that Mexican generation found 
the epistemological justification of a national philosophy.  
   
 
Along with his philosophical message, Ortega¹s Spanish identity also 
excited Ramos. He wrote, 
Ortega¹s most valuable teaching for Mexico and in general 
for Hispanoamerica, is the profoundly Spanish character of 
his thought and of his style. In these, we see an exemplary 
attitude, offering us the "philosophical bases for legitimating 
the aspiration to realize a national philosophy".  
   
 
Ramos claimed that he and his peers wanted independence from 
universalism. Villegas¹ confirms this, adding that the historicism and 
(national) immanentism of Ramos negated not only the universal validity of 
ateneístaconcepts, but of all universal concepts, presumably to include 
legitimacy. Ramos credited Ortega, however, for making this new 
particularism "legitimate" and giving it "philosophical bases". Legitimate in 
whose eyes, one wonders, if not the universalist court of international 
opinion? The above passage shows a tension between the Ramos who 
inveighed publicly against universality, and Ramos who aspired privately to 
universal, possibly foreign, authority. 
Ramos may have harbored secret desires for universal epistemologies of 
value, but in open discourse, the Generation of 1915, as Krauze names it, 
formed an intellectual consensus around the new reason. Ortega¹s writings 
variously called this interpretation of reality perspectivismo, 
circunstancialismo, or razón vital. The Mexican Ortegans benefited from an 
influx of Spanish exiles, often personal acquaintances of Ortega, into their 
clique. The open arms policy that had brought Trotsky and other radical 
personae non gratae to Mexico attracted Spanish dissidents en masse, 
starting in 1938. As examples, Ramos named Gaos, Nicol, Joaquín Xirau, 
Juan Roura-Parella, and Luis Recaséns Siches. Émigrés usually found 
appointments to the proud philosophy faculties of the Universidad Nacional 
Autónoma de México (UNAM), the Casa de España en México, founded in 
the emigration year of 1938 and renamed Colegio de México in 1940, or 
other Mexican universities within a year of arrival. In the 1940s, a 
generational circle closed around the core of Mexican Ortegans and 
imported Spaniards. No territorial challenge would be mounted from 
outside this group until the ambitious Octavio Paz published the book-
length version of Labyrinth of Solitude in 1959. Internecine competition, on 
the other hand, started almost immediately. 
Like Antony¹s skewering of Brutus, this competition had to occur behind a 
thick haze of mutual admiration. The Mexican philosophers of the time 
believed in the sanctity of the nation. The goal of promoting Mexico¹s 
intellectual production outweighed a pensador¹s true opinion of his peers. 
This credo resulted in a strange situation, reminiscent of academic literary 
criticism in 1997 America. After Ramos¹ Perfil de hombre y cultura in 
1934, the members of the circle confined most of their writings to three 
basic and interwoven themes: their friends¹ accomplishments-- "histories" 
of careers that had only recently begun-- the nation, and Ortega. To support 
this assertion, one can peruse the bibliography of Leopoldo Zea, the best-
known Mexican philosopher of US scholars, during the Forties and Fifties. 
Zea¹s body of publication included La historia de la filosofía en México 
(1943), Dos etapas del pensamiento hispanoamericano (1949), "En torno a 
la filosofía mexicana" (1952), La filosofía en México (1955), America in the 
Consciousness of Europe (1955), Esquema para una historia de ideas en 
IberoamÈrica (1956), and "Ortega el americano" (1956). 
Zea formed, with Ramos and Gaos, a troika who throughout the 1940s 
promoted Ortega as the sage of the century. In 1947, Gaos wrote, 
Ortega¹s work is comparable with a great musical 
composition in which an electrifying richness of greater and 
lesser themes appear and reappear interlaced with a harmony 
that doesn¹t run away from the dissonances, all of it designed 
with the most brilliant instrumentation.  
   
 
Flowery words also fell on colleagues who styled themselves Ortegan 
disciples. Among Gaos¹ first writings upon reaching Mexico in 1938 was a 
commentary on the soon-to-be-published second edition of Ramos¹ Profile. 
In it, Gaos could not help connecting his praise of Ramos to Ortega: 
The first thing that was called to my attention, as a Spanish 
disciple of Ortega y Gasset, is the similarity of the problem 
posed in [Ramos¹] book, of the manner of posing this 
problem, and even the sort of attempts at finding a solution, 
with the problems of another advancing country... from which 
was born the work of the Spanish maestro in 1914, the year 
of the Meditaciones del Quijote.  
   
 
In keeping with the Mexican Zeitgeist, Gaos¹ critique followed the 
following pattern: Ortega is great, Ramos is like Ortega, ergo Ramos is 
great. 
The Mexicans¹ special affinity for Ortega among philosophers based itself 
in how, as Ramos noted, his works allowed them to imagine national 
meaning. Gómez-Martínez divides Ortega¹s image into thirds. The first 
facet of this cut stone was Ortega the Spaniard, who compelled Latin 
Americans simply by addressing philosophical questions in their language. 
The belief that the Spanish language lacks a philosophical writing of quality 
seems dated, the inadequacy complex of colonials. However, as late as 
1980, on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of Ortega¹s death, 
Octavio Paz was making the same point: 
His texts are something uncommon in Spanish: exercises in 
clarity that also aspire to a sharpness of focus (nitidez). That 
was one of the greatest gifts to the prose of our language: he 
showed that to be clear is a form of intellectual cleanliness.  
   
 
Ortega¹s second persona was the rather conservative polemicist who warned 
of a "revolt of the masses," (a figure beloved in the United States and 
almost unknown in Latin America, according to Gómez-Martínez). Finally, 
there was the Ortega who relates to this study: the theorist of vital reason 
and circumstance. An analysis of one of his many, vastly similar essays 
shows the theoretical referent on which both polemicists, Gaos and Nicol, 
staked their positions. Ramos mentioned El tema de nuestro tiempo (The 
Modern Theme, 1922) specifically, as inspiring the budding Mexican 
philosophical consensus, and it is key to Nicol¹s analysis of Ortega¹s work 
at large in Historicismo y Existencialismo. 
In El tema de nuestro tiempo, Ortega addresses the problem of truth. For 
truth to be adequate, i.e. true, it needs to be complete and invariable. 
However, Ortega writes engagingly, humanity "has constantly changed its 
mind, consecrating as true whatever it happened to be in favour of at the 
moment." Recognizing this makes some modern men relativists, but how, 
Ortega asks, can they take themselves seriously? If nothing is true, 
relativism itself is a manmade fiction. Outside the relativists, modern 
thought consecrates pure reason, which bases itself on the creaky 
assumption that man is rational. That modern man believes reason is true 
leads, Ortega writes in horror, to revolutions. Ironically, this work became a 
popular text for the house intellectuals of the revolutionary regime in 
Mexico City. 
To escape the arbitrariness of rationalism without falling into relativism 
(which Ortega says brings on suicide), he adds vitality to culture. Culture, 
here defined as imperatives of objective quality like truth, goodness, and 
beauty, needs vitality, defined as imperatives of human life like sincerity, 
emotional drive, and enjoyment. Perceptively, Ortega argues that men have 
been pretending these imperatives are not important, while acting like they 
are. How did objectivity gain its status above subjectivity, when living 
people engendered objectivity in the first place? In Socrates¹ time, Ortega 
explains, the Greeks developed the image of logoi, or ideas purer than 
reality. If ideas are purer than life, knowledge derived from reasoned 
thinking (episteme) is purer than knowledge derived from spontaneous 
convictions (doxai). This devaluation of the spontaneous and lived 
constitutes an irony as man runs around pretending to think what he says, 
instead of saying what he thinks. 
"The modern theme" attacks pure reason with a counterirony, Dionysian 
irreverence, which ridicules the pretensions of reason to absolute 
sovereignty and makes culture serve life instead of the other way around. 
After all, according to Ortega, "life is the cosmic realisation of altruism... a 
perpetual emigration of the vital Ego in the direction of the Not-Self." In 
this conceit, ideas become "fine things", goals that living, spontaneous man 
invented for his own use-- not to displace vital life, but to better understand 
it. This is a common conclusion of the interwar period, when it seemed that 
civilization itself had led to monstrous disregard for life. The carnage 
showed that culture, like individual man, has appetites, too. As an 
alternative to the hypocrisies of culture, Ortega poses a concept fascinating 
to Latin Americans: the "vital estimation of value". When added to 
traditional epistemologies of value, this would enrich our knowledge of the 
world. Man should measure intelligence, for example, not just as the 
"cultural and objective value of truth," but also more vital attributes, like 
dexterity-- how else, Ortega asks rhetorically, can one explain the greatness 
of a brilliant bandit like Napoleon? The crux of the last sentence lies in the 
word also, because Ortega¹s philosophy believes two mutual exclusive 
propositions can both be true. If subjective man, shackled and blind in 
Plato¹s cave, cannot see truth head on, than he can never be certain of 
mutual exclusion (based in limitations on truth¹s possibility) either. 
The paradox is this: knowledge, the acquisition of truths, requires that the 
knower, a subjective being, identify an inherently transcendental, trans-
subjective element: truth. Rationalism imagines reality can penetrate 
knowledge without disturbing it, while relativism denies the existence of 
transcendent reality. Ortega, no relativist, argues that transcendent reality 
exists. Man can perceive parts of it, and is condemned to blindness of 
others. Each person, and each age, dips a mesh of perception through the 
running current of transcendent reality. The pieces of reality this mesh 
catches build a perspective. Far from disturbing reality, perspective is its 
organizing element. 
With this summary, it becomes clearer why readers in the emerging Third 
World would seize on such a philosophy. If progress, like intelligence, 
could also plot itself along different axes (cultural, vital, etc.), then Mexico 
is not really backward. Or rather, Mexico can be both backward, by some 
estimations of value, and ahead by others. Because cultural estimations of 
value reinforced the centrality of the center and the topness of the top, 
reason became "truer" than life. Through revolutionary cataclysm and then 
the aggressive promotion of the nation as intellectual force, Mexicans 
would reorder truth along the axis of vitality and thus right the imbalances 
of positivism. Since Uruguayan pensador José Enrique Rodó¹s Ariel (1900), 
left-leaning intellectuals had convinced themselves that sensitivity was the 
province of the South, and that they should feel pride at this superiority of 
spirit. Ortega¹s perspectivism gave this emotionally resonant self-image an 
additional, philosophical resonance. The genius of Ortega, according to 
Abellán, lay in "knowing how to unconsciously capture and intellectually 
justify a philosophical attitude that is product of the spontaneity of Hispanic 
Man." This reinforces the irony redolent in the earlier passage of Ramos: 
Mexican intellectuals wanted to justify spontaneity, construct a theory to 
allow the natural. It is an irony that the Ortega of Modern Theme would 
have appreciated. 
THE POLEMIC 
No-one promoted the mexicanidad of Ortega more assiduously than Gaos, 
one of the Spanish-born duelists in the 1950 polemic. Gaos made two 
adoptive identities his own: first, Ortegan, and second, Mexican. As 
evidence of his dedication to Ortega¹s ideas, in 1940, Gaos wrote with no 
small emotion, 
Over the years, I have lived in frequent daily coexistence with 
[Ortega]. I have been the hearer of words or the interlocutor 
of conversations in which gestation his own ideas sharpened, 
I have read the unedited manuscripts. In this manner, I no 
longer know if the ideas I think, if the reasoning I do, if the 
example or expression I employ, I know not if I got these 
things from him, or they occurred to me upon hearing or 
reading him, or they occurred to me separately and after all 
the coexistence with him. Sometimes I¹ve had to admit that 
such idea or expression that I considered to be mine I had 
appropriated from him, assimilating it to the point of 
forgetting its origins.  
   
 
Clearly, Gaos did not demure from admitting the signal influence of Ortega 
in his work, something he endeavored to pass on to students like Leopoldo 
Zea. 
The above passage rings characteristic in its personal frankness, for 
autobiographical details abound in Gaos¹ writing. This is appropriate, 
because he believed a philosopher¹s life and times created his destiny. 
Mexican philosophy remembers Gaos best for his so-called filosofía de la 
filosofía, which he outlined in his autobiography cum philosophical tract, 
Confesiones profesionales (Professional Confessions, 1958). Its pretenses to 
universality and professionalism notwithstanding, Gaos believed all 
philosophy to be no more than "personal confession". A philosopher can 
only derive ideas from the particulars of his or her own life. Because of this 
indomitable subjectivity, the number of different philosophies in the world 
equals the number of different philosophers. Approvingly, he often quoted 
the German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte: "The kind of philosophy 
one elects depends on the kind of man one is." Bartra provides a very funny 
précis of Gaos¹s personalist interpretation of the Mexican intellect in an 
imagined symposium, made entirely of actual writings by the putative 
participants, at the Café Paris in Mexico City. Ramos and his follower 
Emilio Uranga are arguing that the Mexican can be construed as a general 
type who likes the Virgin of Guadalupe and bullfights. Bartra¹s Gaos 
interrupts, 
The philosophy of the "Mexican," rather than of man or 
humanity "in general"? Well then it would be of the Mexican, 
if not daring to be of Leopoldo Zea, or of Emilio Uranga...and 
not philosophy, but rather an inexpressible paradoxical 
soliloquy by each one of you concerning yourselves. Strictly 
speaking, it would be each one¹s purely .irrational¹ 
Selbsterlebnis.  
   
 
This individuated philosophy came from one whose Selbsterlebnis was 
marked by a grand juncture, his 1938 escape from the fratricide in Spain. 
The first, Spanish, phase of his life comprised Gaos¹ intellectually formative 
years. Gaos was born in Gijón in 1900. Raised in Oviedo by his 
grandparents, Gaos pursued the bachillerato there and later in Valencia. He 
received his licenciatura in Philosophy and Letters at the University of 
Madrid in 1923. The vestiges of the Generation of 1898 still remained in 
Madrid, and Gaos acquainted himself with the neo-Kantian Morente; 
Zubiri, an adherent first of phenomenology and later of existentialism; and 
Ortega himself. He passed the late 1920s lecturing Spanish at the University 
of Montpelier, France, and completed his doctorate in 1928. In 1930, he 
began his first tenure as professor of philosophy in the University of 
Zaragoza, and then found a position at the University of Madrid in 1933. 
The subsequent period deepened the friendly and intellectual intimacy 
between Gaos and Ortega, who still resided in the capital. It ended with the 
beginning of the Spanish Civil War in 1936, when Gaos and much of the 
university decamped to the city of Valencia, held by the republic. By 1938, 
Franco had almost consolidated his rule over the country, and Gaos fled to 
Mexico City. 
From early on, Gaos refused to call himself exiliado, and instead called 
himself transterrado, which might be understood as "radically naturalized", 
a complex function of his disgust for Franquista Spain, gratitude to his 
Mexican hosts, and possibly even his belief in Fichtian self-invention. The 
Mexican intellectual class reacted to Gaos¹ arrival with enthusiasm, and 
appointed him to a series of prominent lectureships. He taught constantly 
from the time he arrived, first in the Casa de España en México/Colegio de 
México, and UNAM. He toured universities in the provinces, Puerto Rico, 
and Venezuela, as well, where he attended or organized conferences on 
different themes in Spanish American thought, Ortega studies, and Western 
philosophy. 
Gaos loved teaching, and colleagues huffed at how he kept them waiting 
while patiently dissecting an undergraduate theme or doctoral dissertation. 
Lida and Matesanz suggest that two interrelated motivations prodded 
Gaos¹s cultivation of students in his Seminario del Pensamiento en la 
Lengua Española: first was the familiar impetus to build a community of 
first-class scholars who would interpret the Mexican condition correctly. 
This intellectual nationalism would have its locus in the Colegio de México. 
Revolutionary authenticity, a concept associated with the historian 
Edmundo O¹Gorman, was paramount. Scholars of "philosophy" hoped to 
apply native interpretative realities to Mexican (and Spanish and other Latin 
American) texts, while avoiding "recourse to categories extrinsic to the text 
and the context" and the "existing interpretative schemes of other cultures". 
Gaos disabused Zea, for example, of his desire to write a thesis on the 
Greeks and directed him instead to write on the history of ideas in Mexico, 
a suggestion which resulted in Zea¹s famous study of positivism. 
The second motivation for Gaos to affect a deep and abiding union with his 
students was to keep them loyal as they grew into men of influence. They 
would become, as Lida and Matesanz indicate tartly, a "nucleus of close 
disciples" rather than a "group of colleagues". Gaos sought to emulate not 
just the Ortegan intellectual tradition, but Ortega¹s savvy in academic 
politics. 
It was clear that [Gaos] was very attracted to being the 
outstanding and only figure, to be the maestro par excellence, 
just as he had learned from his own maestro par excellence, 
José Ortega y Gasset.  
   
 
Apparently, Gaos¹s ambitions (and the insecurity that is often the obverse of 
such ambition) kept the seminar in Spanish-language philosophy from 
developing into a full-fledged Centro de Estudios Filosóficos to balance the 
Colegio¹s centros of social, philological, and historic study. A larger 
gathering of great minds would have to include rival Quetzalcoatls from 
Spain, a risk that Gaos did not want to take. 
Catalan philosopher Eduardo Nicol followed a similar geographic 
trajectory, but a dissimilar intellectual path from Gaos. As Nicol did not 
embrace biography as the source of all philosophy, he did not leave as many 
details as his colleague. Born in Barcelona, Nicol studied at that city¹s 
university and became director of the Instituto Salmerón in 1933 at the age 
of twenty-six. Like Gaos, Nicol fled Spain in 1939. He landed first in 
Toulouse, and then in Mexico a year later, where he found a position as 
catedrático numerario (full professor) at the UNAM. He helped found the 
Centro de Estudios Filosóficos and two major Mexican philosophical 
journals, Filosofía y Letras and Dianoia. Like Gaos, Nicol was destined to 
live the rest of his life as an exile in Mexico. Unlike Gaos, Nicol had doubts 
about Mexico¹s viability as an intellectual power, which he enunciated in 
his 1961 work, El problema de la filosofía hispánica. 
The literature recalls Nicol as an innovator in philosophy of science and the 
primacy of dialogue. Here, it should be noted that Nicol defined "science" 
more broadly than is common. Science, as Abellán paraphrases Nicol, is 
that which satisfies three conditions: it is material (dealing with a defined 
area of reality), formal (addressed through reason, objectivity, and method), 
and ethical or existential (driven by sophia, pure knowledge, and not 
utility). Four principles govern scientific epistemology: 1) the logical 
relation between thought and itself, 2) the relation between thought and 
reality, 3) the connection between thought and the thinker¹s place in history, 
and 4) dialogue. 
The third principle was Nicol¹s central problem, his life mission. In 
Domínguez Vello¹s analysis of Nicol, he writes, "In Man, the historic is 
ontos and ontos is historic." In other words, the only immutable about man 
is his constant mutation, which makes human knowledge extremely 
problematic. The third principle throws the first two into crisis, because this 
situational, time-conditioned subject has no lasting inner logic and no 
lasting relation to the object. The fourth principle, then, gives the only 
epistemological exit: dialogue comes closest to Truth, as it tests relativity 
against relativity when two communicators try to find common meaning. 
"Meaning is a dialogic fact," Nicol declared in Los principios de la ciencia 
(Principles of Science, 1965), "if a meaning isn¹t shared, the term means 
nothing." Later in the same work, he wrote, "Logos always implies a 
simultaneous communicative intention as well as meaningful content." 
Meaningfully for this study, Abellán writes of Nicol¹s "philosophy of 
science": 
This community of being and unity of the real, as Nicol also 
says, is that which keeps the diversity of subjectivities from 
dissolving Truth, as the personalismos of our day seem to 
believe.  
   
 
Any reader cognizant of Mexican philosophical trends of the 1940s and 
1950s would instantly recognize Abellán¹s reference to Gaos, with whose 
filosofía de la filosofía the term personalismo was inextricably linked. A 
canyon lay between the epistemologies of Gaos and Nicol: while Gaos 
asserted each person¹s distinct version of truth, Nicol claimed that only 
shared truth could have any consequence. 
In 1950, the Colegio de México¹s press published Nicol¹s history of 
ontological thought. Nicol predicated his study on the belief that time 
conditions being, meaning, and reason, a concept known as historicity, 
similar to the third of Nicol¹s four scientific principles. In 428 densely 
printed pages, Nicol covered the history of ontology and epistemology from 
Plato to Heidegger, all the while lamenting the lack of historicity in each 
age¹s conception of being. Nicol advanced no thesis of his own, but, as 
Gaos pointed out, his opinions shone through. In his two reviews of the 
book, Gaos would make two assertions: Nicol¹s treatment of Ortega is the 
real crux of Historicismo y existencialismo, and that this treatment was 
scurrilous and groundless. 
Historicismo y existencialismo follows Ortega through what Nicol 
identified as the four stages of his career: vital reason, exemplified by El 
tema de nuestro tiempo, the historical reason of Las Atlántidas (1924), an 
authenticity (individual essence) which man must escape to be free 
(Pidiendo un Goethe desde adentro, 1932), and finally, its opposite: an 
authenticity which man freely chooses, man as causa sui (Historia como 
sistema, 1942). Nicol organized the chapter as a gradual enlightenment, an 
intellectual search from specious, nihilistic youth to wise maturity. 
In the longest section, that concerning vital reason, Nicol attacked Ortega 
without pause. Nicol believed that vital reason as originally posed by Ortega 
constituted epistemological and ontological nihilism. Ortega¹s 
epistemological confusion, Nicol wrote, consisted in affirming that when 
man does not know the reasons for phenomena, he thinks that these do not 
have a reason. Nicol countered that the search for the (inherently 
unprovable) reasons for things, laws, and phenomena, brings philosophy 
and science into existence, and gives them meaning. Reality, Nicol argued, 
is not thinking, i.e., not as consistent as intelligence, but it is thinkable, i.e. 
consistent enough to permit investigation and to be intellectually or 
rationally represented. The existence of an ordered reality is manifest, Nicol 
said rather hopefully and with no evidence. Ignorance of the constitutive 
laws of this order does not throw us into chaos, but the intrinsic 
impossibility of thinking about the real would. Ontologically, in his vitalist 
period, Ortega declared that being is an article of quasireligious faith. 
Where Ortega tripped, according to Nicol, was in defining existence as the 
Greek metaphysicians defined it: "a stable and fixed figure." As early as 
Heraclitus, Nicol notes, philosophers had steered ontology down a more 
accommodating road. It is not being itself, but rather the laws which 
regulate its change that are stable and fixed. 
Ortega¹s most famous aphorism in Mexico, Nicol recounted, is "Yo soy yo 
y mi circunstancia", a declaration that circumstance as well as identity 
define the horizon of possibility for the individual. According to Nicol, 
there are several problems with this statement. First, Ortega posits the yo 
itself as irreducible (this is necessary to an ontology, based, as Ortega¹s is, 
in perception: if the water is always changing, the net must stay the same). 
The subject, Nicol argued, evolves through history, and even through a 
person¹s life. Nicol also criticized Ortega for not distinguishing adequately 
man¹s varying powers to affect and thus be part of circumstance. One can 
separate these entities into 1) natural and inalterable, 2) natural but within 
man¹s power to change, and, 3) manmade. Finally, Nicol made his most 
serious charge against Ortega¹s aphorism: how can one define yo without 
circunstancia and vice versa? One is the existential function of the other: 
the net helps create the water and the water helps create the net. This, of 
course, is a pure distillation of Husserl¹s eradication of the subject-object 
distinction. What Ortega¹s beloved aphorism lacks is interaction, Nicol 
wrote, between the individual and his environment, and between the 
individual and el otro-yo, tú. The individual filters almost all circumstance 
through other people with whom he interacts. 
Nicol shuddered at relativist individualism, which he claimed as the 
endpoint of Ortega¹s philosophy of truth. He quoted Ortega disapprovingly, 
"Every individual-- person, people, epoch-- is an organ without substitute 
for the conquest of truth... the individual point of view seems to me the only 
point of view from which the world can be seen in truth." Nicol¹s rejoinder: 
"This would perhaps be true, if truth consisted in seeing, and not in 
speaking." The truth is logos, or word. Dialogue transcends pure 
subjectivity, and only when we exchange our impressions, can we know the 
defects in our vision. Nicol faulted Ortega for failing to explain differences 
in the quality of perception: the superiority of a vision founded in 
communicated knowledge rather than the atomized cogitation of one 
person. 
The doctrine of the point of view, in Nicol¹s interpretation of Ortega, 
demanded that perspective, fully articulated, penetrate the system which 
helped create it, a circularity. If reality is the sum of perspectives, each 
individual point of view is irreducible ("Every individual is an essential 
point of view," Ortega wrote). Nicol, wedded to the importance of dialogue, 
found this essentialism absurd. While Nicol¹s Ortega believed only God can 
see the truth (una visión omnímoda) composed of all these partial visions, 
Nicol himself believed that one can test his own singular perspective against 
the divine totality through dialogue with other people¹s fallible perspectives. 
Vitalist Ortega (the one who defended Napoleon¹s decisiveness) said he saw 
life as a task (quehacer), a series of actions. Nicol, however, believed subtle 
assumptions limited what Ortega sold as "life" in toto, especially in his 
banishing ideal truth from it. Nicol cited Bergson to fault the positioning of 
razón vital against razón pura in El tema de nuestro tiempo. The two are, 
Bergson believed, the same. Bergson equated the two "reasons" thus: since 
the possible does not exist in concretion, but has elements of the concrete 
within it, possibility equals the real plus the ideal. 
The first epoch of Ortega¹s work having consumed twenty-two pages, Nicol 
dispatched the subsequent three stages in eighteen. Las Atlántidas (1924) 
represents Ortega¹s second, Diltheyan period, Nicol wrote, although with 
the strange admission that Ortega did not read Dilthey until 1933. Both 
Nicol and Dilthey, according to Nicol, seek to question the permanence of 
Kant¹s categorical imperative. Pure concepts (Kant¹s categories) are 
historical, because the understanding (entendimiento) that gives them flesh 
is historical. Dilthey and Ortega II independently arrive not at relativism 
and the consequent abandonment of categories, but a replacement set of 
categories that can act as constants, reacting to variable understanding. 
Ortega, Nicol recounts, had become fascinated with psychology-- and in the 
Freudian Twenties, he was far from alone-- and believed that in the science 
of the mind lay the key to a new, idoneo, system of categories. As Nicol 
wryly noted, "The idea that psychology could be a valid foundation for 
historical study and man¹s knowledge is characteristic of a certain era." 
Rules that governed the mind¹s act of idea creation would be, for Ortega II, 
the immutable that ideas themselves used to be. 
Nicol touched lightly on the third stage of Ortega¹s development, what 
Nicol called the "surpassing" of Dilthey. Here, according to Nicol, Ortega 
III acknowledged what Nicol himself had urged in his analysis of the vitalist 
stage, the importance of interaction. The atomized psychology of 
motivations could not explain the historical shifts in meaning and 
understanding. Life, Ortega wrote in Pidiendo un Goethe desde adentro 
(1932), is co-life, the interaction of individual lives, which transcends the 
immediate and psychological. What did determine the historicity of 
meaning was the realization of each person¹s individual project of existence. 
The "project", the true ontological kernel of man, consisted in a categorical, 
irreducible possibility for living. Authenticity, or adherence to the "project", 
did not depend on man¹s following a prefixed path, however, but lay in the 
manner he follows the path he chooses. These ideas about authentic destiny 
seem tangled and opaque. Contextually, however, they could serve an 
important political purpose in the Mexico of revolutionary consolidation, 
and are probably what Ramos students mean when they call Perfil de 
hombre y cultura an Ortegan work. A zeal for distilled truth often floats in 
revolution¹s wake, because a revolution, to its adherents, is an event devoid 
of ambiguity-- especially compared with the ancien regime, an age of lies. 
Power then accrues to the authentic, or, in the case of intellectuals, the 
arbiters of authenticity. 
The fourth and final stage of Ortega¹s intellectual production, according to 
Nicol, surpassed the others in its sophistication. According to Nicol, 
Historia como sistema completely inverts the thesis of Pidiendo un Goethe. 
In that work, Ortega posited free will as a deviation from authenticity. In the 
new work, he decided that "man is causa sui." Now, if man follows his free 
will, he serves his unique categorical destiny. The primary character of 
radical reality (the stream in the old metaphor of Tema de nuestro tiempo) 
became dynamism in Historia como sistema, change as the ontological 
constant. History is a system, Nicol quoted Ortega, without a shadow of a 
doubt. The systematic science of historical reality, however, is not history or 
even any of the positive sciences, but ontology. History turns on a 
fundamental reality: man exists and cannot not exist. This is the 
"conducting wire" that allows phenomena that seem unique and 
irreproducible to cohere together. 
Acting swiftly, Gaos wrote two essays analyzing and responding to Nicol¹s 
work, both dated December, 1950. One, "De paso por el historicismo y 
existencialismo," appeared in the Mexican journal of letters Cuadernos 
Americanos, in 1951. The other, "De paso por el historicismo y 
existencialismo: parerga y paralipomena," found print in another scholarly 
periodical, Filosofía y Letras, the same year. The former surveyed Gaos¹s 
criticisms generally; the latter attacked Historicismo y existencialismo 
literally line-by-line. Gaos devoted to Nicol the close reading that authors 
claim they desire from their reviews. As would befit a philosopher of note, 
Gaos showed the same encyclopedic knowledge of the classical and 
Continental forms. 
Primarily, Gaos complained that Nicol used what was advertised as an 
unbiased survey for the ulterior purpose of attacking Ortega. In the first, 
shorter essay, Gaos distinguished between Nicol¹s comments on Ortega and 
the sections on all other philosophers. 
Within this historical scheme, the philosophers to whom 
Nicol dedicates these chapters are only those who represent 
for him the principal articulations of the development of 
historicist and existentialist philosophy, plus one which he 
displays for very different motives: the others are the 
philosophers of the eighteenth century [sic], Leibniz and 
Hegel, Marx, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Bergson, Dilthey, 
Heidegger; the one is Ortega y Gasset.  
   
 
These "very different motives", according to Gaos, are jealousy and libel. 
The picture Gaos painted of Nicol in the essays shows an insecure, semi-
talented man trying to make his own name by sullying someone else¹s. Gaos 
wrote that he felt duty-bound to respond to these attacks. 
Ortega gets the worst role in [Nicol¹s] review... I can¹t 
punctuate my agreement or disagreement with all these 
[interpretations of other philosophers], but I feel I should 
make an exception with those relating to Ortega, I find it 
essential and indispensable on my part.  
   
 
Gaos¹s special attention to the reputation of Ortega y Gasset shows that 
Nicol¹s historicist rereadings of Marx, Hegel, Vico et al could not exercise 
Gaos to the same degree, although these others take a larger place in the 
Western philosophical pantheon than Ortega. Had Nicol published his work 
without interpreting Ortega, it is doubtful that he would have received such 
a detailed and aggressive response from Gaos. 
Nicol¹s interpretation of Ortega isolated Nicol among their peers, according 
to Gaos. He communicated this ad hominem critique (the popularity of an 
argument would seem more appropriate for a political debate, not a 
philosophical one) in an anti-clerical fashion. Gaos wrote, 
But I don¹t know other scholars and experts to whom 
Ortega¹s writings have produced the reiterated frustrations as 
to Nicol, and who think Ortega has no prestige, save the Most 
Reverent Padres, Iriarte, Sánchez Villaseñor, Roig Gironella, 
Garmendía de Otaola, all S.J., and some other less important 
clerics and novitiates.  
   
 
In contrast with these benighted priests, Gaos assembled a list of eminent 
Spanish thinkers, both of the 1898 generation and his own Civil War 
coterie, who "experienced not the slightest frustration" with Ortega¹s 
writing: Morente, Xirau, Recaséns, García Bacca, María Zambrano, Marías, 
and Granell. 
Nicol¹s journey through the thicket of advances, retreats, and internal 
contradictions in Ortega¹s oeuvre offended Gaos, because he believed that 
Nicol reserved this treatment for Ortega alone. Even if Gaos agreed with the 
efficacy of Nicol¹s "historicist method," he could not agree with the 
conclusion that historical inconsistencies invalidated Ortega¹s philosophy 
and his position as a philosopher. Gaos countered, 
The validity of this conclusion would seem to require the 
application of the same method to all the other philosophers, 
without excluding Nicol, with adoption of this criterion: if the 
results are the same, the conclusion should be "all of them are 
or none"; only if the results are exclusive to Ortega, should 
the conclusion be "everyone but him"-- discarding the 
possibility of "no-one but him."  
   
 
To sum up his indignation at Nicol¹s disrespect for Ortega, Gaos asked 
rhetorically how Nicol himself would react to such scrutiny. 
What would Nicol feel, think, and say if someone said of him 
literally that he is a "sophist", "lacking in virtue"? Would he 
say that there were no reasons or motives for saying it? Is he 
so sure, then, of himself that he can throw this stone, in no 
way the first?  
   
 
The above demonstrates the fiercely personal and only indirectly 
philosophical nature of Gaos¹s response. It is evident that Gaos chose to 
emphasize feeling over fact; he discourses at length on the harshness of the 
sophist accusation, rather than concentrate on whether or not it was true. 
Also, crucially, Gaos did not hesitate to play the Spanish Card: he said, in 
effect, that he belonged to a community of learned exiles, and Nicol had 
also been a member of that circle, but had betrayed it. Gaos called on the 
authority that his leadership of the circle afforded him and denounce the 
apostate. 
In two lengthy articles criticizing Nicol¹s bias against Ortega in Historicism 
y existencialismo, Gaos proposed no motive for Nicol¹s putative unfairness. 
It seems certain that Gaos¹s personal friendship with Ortega prompted the 
vehemence of his defense. We remember that Gaos admitted he was 
"essential and indispensable" to Ortega¹s reputation in Mexico. Gaos, 
however, did not speculate about Nicol having a similar enmity for Ortega 
that would provoke him to unfairness. Gaos allowed himself one 
remarkable hypothesis for what caused Nicol to toss aside judicious analysis 
in favor of libel. Employing his own Fichtean filosofía de la filosofía, Gaos 
insinuated that Nicol¹s loneliness had colored his thinking. Nicol fixated on 
dialogue, Gaos wrote, because Nicol himself was missing human contact: 
Nicol knows that I am, even more than historicist, personalist, 
in the sense of the sentence "the kind of philosophy one 
professes depends on the kind of man one is"... In the 
impassioned last part of the book, Nicol paints himself if I am 
not mistaken, like this: "Solitude is an abnormality in the 
human as such, and no-one knows it better than he who has 
had to live it, through imposition of philosophical office, 
through the adverse combination of circumstances, through 
radical vocation seated in his character, or for the three 
motives together."  
   
 
Here, at the very end of the Cuadernos Americanos essay, Gaos made his 
final, most unfriendly innuendo, that Nicol¹s own self-pity had caused him 
to pull Ortega down to his level. 
The same issues of the Cuadernos Americanos and Filosofía y Letras that 
contained Gaos¹s attacks on Nicol gave Nicol an opportunity to refute them. 
First, Nicol drew a global distinction between his dialogic focus and Gaos¹s 
personalismo, presumably to show the gulf between the two writers¹ 
starting purposes. Later, he took a strange detour into the charge of sophism 
levelled against Ortega, an imputation which Nicol argued was not an 
insult, but rather a statement of fact. 
Nicol believed that, as a philosophy of philosophy, personalismo lacked 
both usefulness and heart. He wrote, 
Gaos thinks that philosophy as activity in a personal duty, 
and... its content is equivalent to that of the confession, an 
autobiography, a historical memoir.  
   
 
While these undertakings seem modest, Nicol smelled arrogance and even 
vanity. The representational value of ideas, he noted, decreased as the 
representational value of philosophers increased. He countered the aridity of 
autobiographical philosophy with the expansiveness of his mission: a 
philosophy for the sake of metaphysical engagement. "What keeps us 
engaged in philosophy isn¹t what we produce, but the engagement itself," 
Nicol wrote, if "a well-intentioned man" called the philosophers "servants 
of truth", this was an honor to the service itself, and not truth, which was of 
course conditioned by history. The passion of the engagement-- "drives, 
ambitions, longings, and efforts"-- became love. 
Epistemologically, Nicol was navigating a narrow strait. If universal truth 
does not exist, an idealized "engagement", or any ideal for that matter, 
appears impossible. It is reminiscent of the passage in Historicismo y 
existencialismo in which Nicol attacks Ortega for failing to distinguish 
between being (unstable, in flux) and the "laws which regulate its 
change" (stable, fixed). Nicol chose to ignore that the same historical 
evidence that destroyed the former, also endangered the latter. He 
nevertheless carried the debatable distinction into his Filosofía y Letras 
essay, writing, 
Each one of these [historically conditioned] ideas of man 
faithfully expressed an historical reality, a determined 
ontological situation; none of them was able to grasp the 
integral existence of man, since the permanent structure of his 
being is manifested only in the historical sequence of his 
diverse forms of existence, and it is that which unifies these 
various forms.  
   
 
The love of philosophy, for Nicol, was a component of this permanent 
structure of change, a romantic sentiment that Gaos-- by implication, 
hopelessly alienated from his calling-- could not possibly recognize. 
As romantic love requires personal sacrifice, philosophical love requires 
that the individual stay loyal to the community and its mystical vocation, 
"that which lies behind the theories". Unlike science, Nicol wrote, in which 
solution is possible, philosophy satisfies itself with reworking unsolvable 
problems through dialogue. The sophist threatens this community not 
through lies or even laziness, but through disloyalty. The philosopher 
betrays his calling, when he fails to acknowledge the importance of the 
philosophical community. In Nicol¹s phrasing, 
...this harmony isn¹t broken with discrepancies of theory, but 
only when a dissonant voice compromises the unity of the 
concert, and threatens the meaning of philosophy itself... 
consequently all true philosophers always agree. The 
discordant is the sophist.  
   
 
Nicol completed his charter for an historical logos with a passage that can 
be understood as a commentary on Gaos¹s placement of individual career 
over philosophical community. For Nicol, the scholar should not act on 
...the professional vanity of mounting a better-looking 
mousetrap, nor to receive the congratulations of those who 
recognize our technical powers, but rather because the 
problems themselves appear to be connected to one another; 
and if we feel and live in an authentic way, if the problems 
pain us inside, the attempt to tackle them and resolve them 
integrally converts itself for us into a vital necessity and never 
in the mere lust for intelligence.  
   
 
At its base, then, philosophy should not aim to please or even edify others, 
but serves as balm for the doubter, a way to feel better about the demise of 
truth. 
The response to Gaos became more personal in Nicol¹s meditation on 
sophistry and his colleague¹s indignation about it, in the section called 
"Ortega". The passage shows Nicol¹s belief in the sanctity of philosophy, a 
calling so precious that the first symptoms of the sophistry virus required 
the destruction of the host. Gaos had asked how Nicol would feel if called 
"sophist" by a colleague. Nicol responded that rather than charging Ortega 
with a crime, he had diagnosed him with an illness, a tumor on the body 
philosophic: 
Sophistry is a sickness of philosophy. A contagious and 
periodic illness, whose symptoms have been perfectly 
identified since they manifested themselves for the first time 
in Greece... Calling a pensador a sophist isn¹t anything else 
than to diagnose him: it isn¹t an insult or an aggression, nor 
an expression of personal antipathy, nor a gratuitous 
animosity.  
   
 
Here, Nicol chose not to define sophism, an omission that handicaps his 
standing to make the charge. He sniffed, 
I have concerned myself so many times with the issue, that it 
would be superfluous to repeat now the list of all the peculiar 
characteristics presenting the sophist attitude.  
   
 
The Greeks defined sophism as an argument which appears sound but 
whose inference is not justly deduced from its premise. If time conditions 
meaning and being, as Nicol emphasized continually throughout his career, 
the separation of inferences and premises, since it involves the before and 
after of a fixed entity, becomes confused. Nicol criticized Gaos for 
shunning the community of ideas, but he had no specifics to show how a 
community of ideas lacking a single, unassailable truth would govern itself 
and name its enemies. 
Gaos had also claimed a community as his ally in the polemic, the 
community of Ortega scholars, but Nicol saw the supposedly solid Ortegan 
faction as riddled with fissures. 
[Gaos] establishes, in effect, two opposed groupings: he 
includes me in the so-called adversaries of Ortega... he 
includes himself in the group of the partisans, among those he 
names various distinguished Spanish colleagues. But here it 
needs to be said that neither are all [our colleagues] present, 
not are all those present so partisan: not all those who Gaos 
mentions as partisans of Ortega would refuse to recognize the 
justice of my diagnosis, even though they wouldn¹t have felt 
obliged to indicate it on their own; neither do all those who 
consider [Ortega¹s] influence injurious figure in the opposing 
list.  
   
 
Nicol, then, admitted some Spanish exiles in Mexico were not saying what 
they really thought about Ortega. When scholars do not air their opinions 
about a given topic in their field, it could be because it is not important 
enough, because they are undecided, or because they fear the reaction if 
these views were made public. As for the first and second options, in 1956, 
Zea claimed flatly that, without Ortega, philosophical meditations on the 
American condition could not have happened. 
From Spain and through the efforts of Ortega, to our America 
arrived the philosophical doctrines that justified and gave 
philosophical quality to meditation on American reality. The 
vital reason of Ortega and the historicism of the 
contemporary German philosophers gave to the present-day 
generation that toils in the fields of philosophy in 
Hispanoamerica the instrument to develop their ideas in the 
same line as the old pensadores.  
   
 
If these dissenters from Ortega¹s greatness remained silent because of 
indifference or indecision, it would counter reams of evidence, including the 
above, of Ortega¹s primacy to Mexican and Latin American thought. 
The final option, that intimidation played a part in silencing criticism of 
Ortega, has the following conjectural bases. One is grandiose praise. 
Ramos, Gaos, and Zea had heaped so much praise on Ortega that an 
unmasking of the maestro as a sophist would make them look foolish a la 
"The Emperor¹s New Clothes". Gaos¹s fierce ambition to be the maestro par 
excellence of Mexican philosophy and consequential dislike of dissent also 
supports intimidation, since Gaos had yoked his career so tightly to the 
reputation of Ortega that a fall in that reputation could have taken Gaos¹s 
leadership with it. The length and ferocity of Gaos¹s broadside against Nicol 
also lends to the intimidation hypothesis. It is possible to see Gaos¹s reviews 
as a warning to others, since a younger (or native Mexican) writer might 
have seen the end of his career after such a withering attack. Finally, and 
most importantly for the larger historical context since it involves the 
construction of a national consensus rather than Gaos¹s personal priorities, 
Ortega¹s importance to the self-image of the Mexican philosophical 
community could allow no dissent against Ortega¹s greatness. 
For if Ortega made possible the transition from lowly pensamiento to true 
philosophy in Mexico, as Zea claimed above, acts undermining Ortega¹s 
intellectual standing could undermine that transition. It is a fact that many 
respected Mexican academics of the 1930s and 1940s had tethered their 
reputations to Ortega¹s-- Gaos, Ortega¹s personal friend, most of all. When 
Gaos pilloried Nicol, was he trying to avoid demotion to the status of a 
nineteenth-century pensador? Without the justification (a word that both 
Zea and Ramos employ) of Ortega¹s vital estimation of value, the Mexican 
"philosophers" could fall to the class of a José María Luis Mora, the 
Benthamite architect of Benito Juárez¹s reforms, the Porfirian positivist 
Gabino Barreda, or even José Vasconcelos. These men, because of their 
devotion to practical matters of statecraft, elections-- even bureaucracy-- 
took on the appearance of thinkers rather than philosophers. Zea wrote, in 
effect, that although the contemporary Mexican intellectual performs the 
same social tasks as his prerevolutionary predecessor, the modern man 
advances beyond his ancestor in status, because of environmental changes, 
instigated by the Germans through Ortega. Ortega expanded and elasticized 
the notion of a philosophical tradition sufficiently so that men who 
expounded on worldly subjects and unused to the extreme abstraction of 
European arguments could also claim the lofty status of philosopher. With 
Nicol¹s criticisms of Ortega, this structure came under threat. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The vast areas of agreement between Gaos and Nicol can strike a 
contemporary reader of the Gaos-Nicol polemic as unexpected. Villegas 
neatly expresses this Ortegan consensus, which Nicol, in spite of himself, 
shares, in two points. The first axiom is that man is an historical being, 
without an unchanging essence, and the second posits that this history 
consists in a "succession of closed perspectives." Villegas concedes the first 
point readily, while the second has a number of handicaps that neither Gaos 
or Nicol acknowledge. The sequential adoption and abandonment of 
ontological realities gives no allowance for continuity, Villegas argues, 
while time itself is manifestly unbroken. Ortega¹s most ridiculous foray into 
successionism, which Villegas does not mention, was his belief that 
generations, e.g. the "Generation of 1789", are real, almost biological, rather 
than simply a useful artifice for organizing intellectual history. Both Gaos 
and Nicol leave this uncriticized, and indeed Ortega¹s generational notion 
took firm hold in Latin American discourse. 
The other major area of agreement between Gaos and Nicol lay in their 
mutual belief that philosophy, although important, had virtually nothing to 
say about the world outside. Gaos believed that philosophy taught about 
philosophers-- to understand the philosophy of X, simply study X¹s life. 
There is, of course, a circularity here, which one can demonstrate with an 
example: it is important to study the philosopher Plato, because he wrote 
important philosophy, the only meaningful gleanings from which involved 
the life of Plato, who was an important philosopher. Nicol argued that 
philosophy had importance, because it gave men with a predisposition 
toward the big questions a device and outlet for asking them. In a way, this 
is even more solipsistic than Gaos. At least Gaos believed that the primary 
beneficiaries of philosophy, if not humanity, were latter-day students of the 
field. According to Nicol, the primary beneficiaries of philosophy were 
philosophers. 
These areas of agreement lead one back to the question of politics. The 
careerist hypothesis laid out in this study, Gaos¹s effort to define and delimit 
what was intellectually possible, seems consistent with both both men¹s 
ideas about the purpose of philosophy and philosophers. Broadly speaking 
they both argued that the institution should and does serve itself first. Since 
the philosopher¹s vocation calls him only to satisfy himself and his 
colleagues, the field requires authenticity to prevent indistinguished 
claimants from taking the identity filósofo. Of course, the "historical" 
annihilation of universality that turns philosophy inward equally invalidates 
any authenticity beyond the emotional, but neither Nicol and Gaos 
addressed this problem. Whether the philosophical work is true or 
important-- the "eternal" distinctions before historicity-- means little, so 
authenticity bases itself on more honestly subjective criteria: reputation, 
groupthink, and even racialist assumptions, like Spanish philosophy over 
Mexican, Germany over Spain. In a fierce criticism of Gaos published, 
interestingly enough, after the maestro¹s death, Humberto Martínez argued 
that if one limits the philosophical pursuit as narrowly as Gaos did, 
cynicism cannot be far behind: 
If philosophy were, as Gaos said, an activity that could not 
provide us objective knowledge about anything, I fear that 
one would have to accept the words of Rossi: "philosophy," 
he said out of hand, "is good for nothing."  
   
 
This cosmic shrug at the discipline¹s ability to inform about anything 
beyond itself coheres with Lida¹s suggestion that Gaos systematically 
nudged rivals from any forum that he led. What fills a vacuum of ideas, if 
not ambition and power: politics. 
Nicol too may have been concealing political messages beneath a purely 
philosophical exterior. By returning constantly to dialogue and its value, 
Nicol may have been communicating his displeasure with a man who Nicol 
thought wanted to turn Mexican philosophy from symposium to 
monologue. Perhaps because of Gaos¹s clampdown, other scholars were 
withholding their opinions of Ortega, in effect suppressing the dialogue 
which Nicol saw as philosophy¹s reason for existing. His disappointment 
with the unprincipled caving of others is a theme that resonates through 
much of Nicol¹s writing. According to Sagols, Nicol admitted that ethos and 
logos had fallen into crisis. Nicol had nostalgically prescribed that men 
remain loyal to "truth, rigor, and beauty," even as they know that these are 
historical and therefore inconceivable and unattainable. Sagols muses, 
We have to ask what Nicol¹s philosophy wants, when at the 
same time as it explores [the ethos-logos] relation with great 
conceptual rigor, it tells us clearly and manifestly of the 
extinction of ethics and the death of the beautiful and rational 
word.  
   
 
If the answer is Nicol¹s emotional litany of "love, hope, and health", Sagols 
asks where one can find such comforts in Nicol¹s own philosophy, which 
offers little else than negation and crisis. It is heroism, she answers, the 
heroism of acting as if, in Nicol¹s words, "irrationality, politics, cybernetics, 
and the teacher¹s own penury... could never annul his commitment." 
Nicol¹s final complaint, then, may have been that both Ortega and Gaos 
failed to make philosophy look pure. In the case of Ortega y Gasset, Nicol¹s 
righteousness flared hottest when a youthful Ortega intimated that reality 
was simply unavailable, that the layers of perspective were simply too 
opaque and confusing for truth to emerge. Nicol, however, seemed to also 
believe that man could not obtain objectivity, but by trying he lifted himself 
from the ignoble fate of "I cannot." In the case of Gaos, Nicol saw the 
emphasis on philosophical biography as trivial. Since the appearance of 
profundity moved Nicol far more than (nonexistent) profundity itself, Gaos 
had committed a grave offense by lifting a veil of seriousness from the lives 
of greats, not to exclude Nicol¹s own. 
What horrifies an ordinary person in such a debate, however, serves as the 
most basic stipulation to the polemicists of 1950. Both Gaos and Nicol 
flatly accepted that the epistemological and ontological bases of personal 
and political life themselves rest on sand. It is with this observation that 
Mexico can at last be brought back into the sights of this report. None of the 
aforementioned studies of the postrevolutionary intellectual regime address 
a hidden reality about historical epistemology and ontology and the 
establishment of an independent state among the Mexicans. Elena 
Poniatowska¹s Hasta no verte, Jesús mío and Carlos Fuentes¹ La muerte de 
Artemio Cruz, exuberant, fictional tragicomedies better illustrate the fact 
that, if time conditions all being and meaning, then mexicanidad is a 
rallying cry and authentic identity only for the rubes. The meaning of any 
historical event, even the sacred Revolution, has already shifted the second 
after that event has ended, and, significantly, the very thing that liberated a 
moment ago can enslave in the next. 
The serious discussion of Mexican authenticity among men who did not 
believe in any essence made philosophers of the post-Ateneo century true 
politicians. It was a politician who invented the "concept" whose only value 
is its efficacy in getting others to do what one wants. Liberal philosophies 
saw the world as a grand irreducible in the image of the West, and Zea has 
condemned this solipsism in innumerable works, to the point of dismissing 
the entire 1800s as his continent¹s "lost century". The same Ortegan 
principles of vitality and circumstance, however, that nullify Humanity as a 
constant in the intellectual equation can do no better for the Nation, and 
broken ideals swiftly set the stage for cynicism and misrule. By failing to 
imagine a credible replacement for universal principle, the crushingly 
limited purposes of Gaos and Nicol tacitly canceled all distinction and 
allowed mediocrity to fill the emptiness.  
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